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The Intent Standard and Equal
Protection Law
The 1976 decision of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis1 im-
posed a new burden upon equal protection plaintiffs: proof of invidious
intent or purpose.2 This Note argues that the development of the intent
standard since Davis is best understood as a stratagem to limit the scope
of relief available to the equal protection litigant. Focusing on the Court's
decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden,' this Note draws out the underlying
hostility to broad remedial orders in equal protection cases, from Davis to
the present, and demonstrates how that hostility has colored the develop-
ment of the intent doctrine.
I. The Development of the Intent Standard
The Warren Court developed two-tier equal protection scrutiny prima-
rily in response to overt discriminatory practices whose purpose and effect
were identical and unmistakable. The question of intent emerged in equal
protection analysis only when the focus of litigation shifted to the discrim-
inatory impact of practices not facially discriminatory. Not until Wash-
ington v. Davis was it suggested that the intent to discriminate was a
necessary part of an equal protection violation.
A. Two-Tier Scrutiny
Prior to Davis, equal protection analysis proceeded primarily along two
tiers of review.4 State action infringing upon fundamental rights5 or em-
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. This Note uses the terms "intent," "purpose," and "motive" interchangeably. While a great
deal has been written about the nuances of the different meanings of each, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 209 (1962), the Court has failed to give significance to these differences, see
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 104 n.55; Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Consti-
tutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 955-62 (1978); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and
Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 106 n.321 (1977); Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21
(1970).
3. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
4. "The Warren Court embraced a rigid two-tier attitude. Some situations evoked the aggressive
'new' equal protection, with scrutiny that was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact; in other contexts, the
deferential 'old' equal protection reigned with minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact."
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
5. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of protection of activities of uniquely private
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ploying a suspect classification' was subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scru-
tiny created a presumption of unconstitutionality, which could be rebutted
only by establishing both a compelling state interest and a tight fit be-
tween the means chosen and the state objective.7 A challenged state action
not falling within one of these categories needed only to bear a rational
relation to the articulated state purpose.8
Strict scrutiny may be said to have inferred motive; once invoked, courts
presumed illicit purpose and imposed a high burden of proof upon the
state's rebuttal.' But the exact relationship between intent and an equal
protection violation was never clearly established. 0 As pointed out by
nature); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Tlhompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (right of interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to an adequate criminal de-
fense); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (same); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
The nearly automatic invalidation of statutes affecting fundamental rights made the Court hesitant
to expand the category of rights considered fundamental. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 307 (majority opinion) (right to work
not a fundamental right); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a
fundamental right).
6. The concept of suspect classification originated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944). While primarily applied to race, see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), it has
also been held to include ancestry, see Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), and alienage, see
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)
(refusal to treat sex as a suspect classification).
7. See Kramer v. Union School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1968) (property-based qualifications
for voting struck down under strict scrutiny).
8. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (legitimate
classifications valid unless they bear no rational relation to state's objectives); San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (classifications must rationally further some legitimate,
articulated state purpose).
Because of the sharp contrast between the two levels of scrutiny, the Court came under pressure to
adopt, and ultimately adopted, intermediate tiers. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring) (gender based classification requires "a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (same).
9. Professor Ely notes that "the doctrine of 'suspect classifications,' though not generally so under-
stood, turns out on analysis to function as a handmaiden of motivation analysis." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 145 (1980). He views suspectness as a way in which the Court has extended the
inquiry to determine "whether the initial suspicions aroused by the classification are well founded or
rather on fuller exploration can be allayed." Id. at 147; see Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental
Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1069 (1978).
The Court's failure to articulate the exact source of the violation reflects uncertainty over the pre-
cise substantive rights afforded by the Constitution. Part of this uncertainty stems from the language
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the ambiguity of the value of equality that it constitutionalizes. See
Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976). The Court has
wavered between a concept of equal treatment, which connotes equality in the process of allocating
social rewards, and equal status, which points to equality of results. See Comment, Proof of Racially
Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington
Heights, Mt. Healthy and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 727-28 (1977).
10. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 2 (criticizing narrow focus on legitimacy of governmental
action underlying intent doctrine); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citi-
zenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977) (advocating "equal citizen-
ship" doctrine to escape doctrinal confusion); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 342-44 (1949) (seminal formulation of need for government to treat
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Justice Marshall, the Warren Court's decisions were compatible with
three divergent propositions: (i) that purpose alone was the test of consti-
tutionality; (ii) that effects alone were the test; and (iii) that some combi-
nation of purpose and effects defined constitutionality.11
The issues before the Warren Court did not require a clear articulation
of the relationship between intent and an equal protection violation. In
cases that involved the dismantling of state-imposed segregation, such as
Brown v. Board of Education,12 discriminatory purpose was expressed on
the face of the statutes or ordinances and was inseparable from the ensu-
ing effects. When courts were later confronted with secondary forms of
discrimination-facially neutral practices adopted to perpetuate de jure
segregation and often taken to circumvent judicial desegregation or-
ders13-the relation between purpose and effects was no longer self-
evident.
Not only was the relationship between intent and liability uncertain, it
was uncertain whether evidence of intent was even admissible to establish
a violation. The Court's decisions in United States v. O'Brien'4 and
Palmer v. Thompson 5 rejected any direct inquiry into motive" and
prompted the seminal articles by Professors Ely"7 and Brest"8 arguing for
the centrality of legislative motive in establishing a constitutional violation.
Intent was resurrected by Justice Brennan in Keyes v. School District No.
1,19 which presented the Court with the first challenge to school segrega-
tion in a jurisdiction without a history of de jure race separation. Justice
.Brennan's opinion defined purposeful segregation as the equivalent of de
jure segregation,20 thus bringing it within the analytic framework applica-
similarly those similarly situated under equal protection doctrine).
11. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 148 n.4 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 39 (confusion over roles of impact and motive of disastrous proportions);
Ely, supra note 2, at 1207 (confusion over role of motive); Samford, Toward a Constitutional Defini-
tion of Racial Discrimination, 25 EMORY L.J. 509 (1976) (same).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (swimming pools of Jackson, Miss.,
closed in response to desegregation order); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (school
system shut down to escape compliance with court desegregation order).
14. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
15. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
16. The Court in O'Brien asserted: "'The decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no
support whatever to the assertion that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the
assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exercised.'" 391 U.S. at
383 (quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)). In Palmer, the Court declared that it
had never "held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of
the men who voted for it." 403 U.S. at 224.
17. Ely, supra note 2.
18. Brest, supra note 2.
19. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Professor Brest saw in Keyes an acknowledgement of the need to ex-
pand the evidentiary base for equal protection claims. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1976).
20. 413 U.S. at 208.
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ble to suspect classifications. While Keyes allowed proof of invidious in-
tent to suffice in establishing a claim of unconstitutional discrimination, it
did not hold that intent was a necessary criterion for liability.
21
B. The Articulation of the Intent Standard
The intent test took on a life of its own three years later in Washington
v. Davis,2 2 which effectively turned Keyes on its head and fundamentally
altered the presumptions of prior equal protection doctrine. Prior to Da-
vis, the Court had not addressed the question of whether the discrimina-
tory impact of state action was sufficient to establish liability; 3 but lower
federal courts had treated state actions with disproportionate racial impact
as creating a "suspect (racial) classification" and therefore subject to a test
approximating strict scrutiny.24 Davis rejected that approach, holding that
strict scrutiny would be applied only where a discriminatory impact on a
suspect class was accompanied by a showing of invidious purpose;" such
purpose would not be presumed simply because the disadvantaged group
was a suspect class. 6
The full significance of Davis depended crucially on what effects, if
21. See Annual Conference of Second Judicial Circuit, 74 F.R.D. 215, 277 (1976) (comments of
Prof. Owen Fiss) (Keyes held intent sufficient but not necessary); Note, Reading the Mind of the
School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/Dc Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 349-52
(1976) (same). The Court held that where intent established de jure segregation it was sufficient to
impose a duty on school authorities to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory system.
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. The Court's opinion did not address what, if anything, would satisfy a de
facto challenge to segregation.
22. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Prior to Davis, the extent to which intent was needed to establish liabil-
ity was uncertain; afterwards it was uncertain to what degree the effects of discrimination would be
considered probative of a constitutional violation. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution." Id. at 242.
23. In Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), the Court upheld an effects test to
weigh the constitutionality of action taken to promote or thwart desegregation. "[W]e have focused
upon the effect-not the purpose or motivation-of a school board's action in determining whether it
is a permissible method of dismantling a dual system. The existence of a permissible purpose cannot
sustain an action that has an impermissible effect." Id. at 462. This case was of limited precedential
value, however, because liability of the affected jurisdiction had, arguably, been previously established.
Emporia schools were covered by a desegregation order directed at Greensville County. Following the
desegregation order in Wright v. School Board, 252 F. Supp. 378 (1966), the city of Emporia with-
drew from the county school system.
24. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976); see, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1972) (de facto racial
classification suspect); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d
Cir. 1970) (compelling governmental interest needed to sustain zoning policy having discriminatory
effect).
25. "Standing alone [disproportionate impact] does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifica-
tions are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considera-
tions." Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
26. Cf supra note 9 (suspect classifications indirect indices of intent). Notice of the changed stan-
dard was served with the shocking reversal of lower court opinions not even up for review. Davis, 426
U.S. at 244-45 n.12.
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any, would be admitted to prove invidious purpose."' Both Davis and Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corpo-
ration28 indicated the relevance of the disproportionate impact of the chal-
lenged state action to establishing an inference of purposeful
discrimination. In addition, a pre-Davis distinct line of cases, using tests
derived from tort law, held defendants to have intended the natural and
foreseeable consequences of their actions. 29 These evidentiary tools al-
lowed courts to create a rebuttable presumption of intent and shift the
burden of proof to the defendant state body.30 With the burden shifted,
the failure to provide an adequate nonracial reason for state action was
considered probative of intent. 1 Thus, while Davis and its progeny in-
27. See Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925,
938 (1978) (major issues are evidentiary); Simon, supra note 9, at 1130 (same).
28. 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (impact of official action may provide important starting point in
establishing invidious purpose) (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886)). A long line of pre-Davis cases supports the proposition that motives can be inferred from
practices. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207-08 (1973) (discrimination presumed
throughout district from practice in one area); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1967)
(proper to examine practices over time in ascertaining motive); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S.
218, 230-32 (1964) (intent in closing county schools inferred from past segregative practices); Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 276 (1939) (intent of grandfather clause evident from practice of discrimination
against Negro voters); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 592 (1st Cir. 1974) (pattern of segregative
practices establishes motive), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872,
880 (S.D. Ala.), aifd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (intent of literacy test inferred from practice of
excluding Negro voters).
29. See United States v. Texas Edue. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 389-92 (5th Cir. 1976) ("natural,
foreseeable and inevitable result"), vacated and remanded sub nom. Austin Indep. School Dist. v.
United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530, 536-37 (8th Cir.
1975) (Omaha 1) (presumption based on natural, probable and foreseeable consequences test), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975), reald per curiam, 541 F.2d 708, 709 (8th Cir.) (Omaha I1) (en bane),
vacated per curiam, 433 U.S. 667 (1976), reaff'd per curiam, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977) (Omaha
111) (en bane); Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974) (presumption of segregative purpose
from foreseeable result), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410,
479 (D. Mass. 1974) (dictum) (foreseeable segregative consequences evidence of intent), afl'd sub
nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 508 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Fiss,
School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1974); Note, Intent to
Segregate: The Omaha Presumption, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775, 815 (1976); see also NAACP v.
Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir. 1977) (purpose inferred post-Davis from foreseeable
results of school board attendance zone policies).
30. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (burden shifts to state to rebut
presumption of unconstitutionality); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970) (same); Oliver v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974) (following practice developed in employ-
ment discrimination cases of allowing presumption of intent to be established by objective facts and
then permitting affirmative defense), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 498-500 (1977) (failure to rebut presumption
probative of intent); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (state must rebut presumption of
unconstitutionality created by prima facie case).
Allowing the failure to rebut a presumption to be probative of intent also has pre-Davis preceden-
tial support. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (good faith defense insufficient to
dispel prima facie case); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 361 (1970) ("evidentiary void" in rebutting
prima facie case confirms complainant's charge of discrimination); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S.
584, 587 (1958) (assertions of nondiscrimination by defendant insufficient to rebut presumption).
Intent and Equal Protection
creased the burden upon equal protection plaintiffs, preexisting eviden-
tiary standards and those adopted immediately after Davis still allowed
liability to be established on the basis of effects without direct evidence of
subjective motive.
II. The Impact of Bolden
Both the scope of the intent standard and the requisite criteria for es-
tablishing discriminatory purpose were addressed in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.32 Holding for the first time that invidious purpose must be proved
to establish liability in a voting rights claim, a divided Court overturned
and remanded a finding that at-large elections unconstitutionally diluted
the votes of blacks in Mobile, Alabama. In Bolden, the intent standard
was extended for the first time to claims brought under the Fifteenth
Amendment and under the fundamental rights strain of the Fourteenth
Amendment."3 This extension substantially redefined constitutional pro-
tections, erecting a major obstacle to equal protection litigation against
institutional discrimination. 4
Although the Court purported to apply an already established intent
standard, its holding was, in fact, irreconcilable both with precedent and
with the conventionally understood doctrinal basis of intent. Writing for
32. Six separate opinions were filed in this case. Justice Stewart authored the plurality opinion
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist. The plurality reversed and
remanded for proof of invidious purpose on the part of the state legislature that created Mobile's city
government. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun
concurred in the result because of the scope of relief afforded plaintiffs. Id. at 83 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the result). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment based on his view that greater
deference should be accorded to the states where neutral and legitimate government activity is in-
volved. Id. at 92 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice White dissented on the grounds that
lower court holdings were sufficient to establish invidious purpose. Id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall dissented based on his view of voting as a fundamental right not subject to the Davis
intent test. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan dissented and joined the opinions of
Justices White and Marshall. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. See infra pp. 342-44.
34. The result of the plurality opinion is to hold plaintiffs to a threshold burden of establishing
subjective motive through direct evidence. For the difficulties of establishing institutional motivation,
see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is unrealistic. . . to
require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the dcci-
sionmaker. . . ."); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 227 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (inadequacy of any test "resting on so nebulous and elusive an element as
a school board's segregative 'intent' "); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (difficult for a
court to ascertain motivation of a group of legislators); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968) (difficult for a court to determine motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie
behind legislative enactment); Alexander, supra note 27, at 937; Brest, supra note 2, at 120 n.124
(even intent of majority is shaky basis for constitutional doctrine since it may not be predicate for
decision taken); Ely, supra note 2, at 1219-21, 1268 (only motive of majority of legislators sufficient
for judicial evaluation); Annual Conference of Second Judicial Circuit, supra note 21, at 278 (institu-
tional perspective complicates notion of intent); Comment, supra note 9, at 733 (same); Note, supra
note 21, at 332-37 (same).
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the Bolden plurality, Justice Stewart 5 went far beyond simply extending
the intent standard to the voting rights context; 36 his opinion completely
undermined the evidentiary standards for proving intent that had evolved
since Davis.37 Overruling the Fifth Circuit,38 the plurality refused to infer
35. A precursor to Justice Stewart's opinion can be found in his dissent in Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969). In a challenge to a property requirement for eligibility
to vote in school district elections, Justice Stewart argued for a rational relation test, rejecting height-
ened scrutiny under a fundamental rights analysis. Id. at 636-37.
36. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion). In order to arrive at this
conclusion, Justice Stewart had to undertake a three-part analysis of the rights at stake: (i) Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976), was held to do no more than elaborate on the
language of the Fifteenth Amendment and therefore to add nothing to the Fifteenth Amendment
claim, id. at 61; (ii) the Fifteenth Amendment was defined to prohibit "only purposefully discrimina-
tory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote 'on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude,'" id. at 65; and (iii) only purposeful discrimination was held to be a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 66.
37. See Parker, The Impact of City of Mobile and Strategies and Legal Arguments for Voting
Rights Cases in Its Wake, in ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION CONFERENCE REPORT: THE RIGHT TO
VOTE 98, 112-18 (1981) (describing evolution of pre-Bolden evidentiary standards).
Although the intent standard had not been imposed on vote dilution cases, the high threshold bur-
den of proof in these cases closely paralleled the post-Davis factors establishing intent. See, e.g., White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973)
(en banc), affd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall,
424 U.S. 636 (1976). This similarity in evidentiary standards led the Fifth Circuit panel in Bolden v.
City of Mobile, 571 F.2d 238, 246 (1978), rev'd and remanded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), to rule that
satisfaction of the White and Zimmer criteria created a presumption of purpose.
White adopted the test of Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971), and held that the
burden of plaintiffs was to produce
evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less
opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and
to elect legislators of their choice.
412 U.S. at 766. The use of at-large voting for the Texas legislature in Dallas and Bexar counties
was held to have unconstitutionally diluted the votes of blacks and Mexican-Americans based on: (i)
the history of official racial discrimination in Texas; (ii) the requirement of a majority vote for nomi-
nation in a party primary; (iii) the "place" rule that guaranteed that blacks would run head-to-head
against white candidates; (iv) the fact that the only two blacks elected since Reconstruction were those
slated by the white-controlled Dallas Committee for Responsible Government (DCRG); and (v) the
fact that the DCRG did not need electoral support from blacks and could therefore disregard their
needs and aspirations. Id. at 766-67.
The Zimmer court further elaborated the factors in White:
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating candidates, the
unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underly-
ing the preference for multi-member or at-large districting, or that the existence of past dis-
crimination in general precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case
is made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candi-
dates running from particular geographical subdistricts. The fact of dilution is established
upon proof of the existence of an aggregate of those factors.
485 F.2d at 1305 (footnotes omitted).
38. The district court in Bolden, while rejecting application of the Davis intent standard to voting,
found facts supporting the principal non-subjective evidentiary bases of intent and ruled that plaintiffs
had satisfied the requirements of White and Zimmer. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384
(S.D. Ala. 1976), alf'd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). On
appeal the Fifth Circuit panel accepted defendant's argument that intent must be proved, but held
that satisfaction of the White and Zimmer criteria, combined with defendant's failure to rebut those
criteria and establish convincingly an adequate nonracial reason for the maintenance of at-large deec-
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intent from the totality of evidentiary factors, and, treating the concerns
raised by the plaintiffs in isolation, dismissed each as a ground for impos-
ing liability.3 9 Findings of discriminatory impact by the district court were
dismissed as insufficient, standing alone, to support a claim of purposeful
discrimination.4 0 The use of foreseeability was effectively eliminated by
the plurality's reliance on the most restrictive aspects of Personnel Admin-
istrator v. Feeney.41 Past discrimination was equated with "original sin"
and held to be of "limited help" in establishing purpose.42 Similarly, the
inadequacy of nonracial reasons was dismissed as a line of inquiry since
alternative explanations are, the plurality asserted, "almost always"
available.4
tions, was sufficient to establish discriminatory purpose. 571 F.2d at 246. On remand, 542 P. Supp.
1050 (1982), the district court again struck down at-large elections based upon invidious purpose in
their adoption and discriminatory effects in their maintenance.
39. See 446 U.S. at 72-73. The radical redefinition of the intent standard wrought by this rejec-
tion of previous evidentiary standards is highlighted by the dissent of Justice White, the author not
only of Davis but also of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the leading Supreme Court opinion
on at-large elections. Though written prior to the articulation of an intent standard in Davis, White v.
Regester's totality of the circumstances evidentiary test closely paralleled the post-Davis evidentiary
norms for proving purpose in the case of institutional defendants. See supra note 37. As Justice White
pointed out, the Bolden plurality's redefinition of evidentiary standards was not the inevitable result of
applying the intent requirement to at-large elections: "By viewing each of the factors relied upon
below in isolation the plurality rejects the 'totality of the circumstances' approach we endorsed in
White v. Regester, Washington v. Davis, and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp." 446 U.S. at 103 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
40. The plurality opinion declared:
It may be that Negro candidates have been defeated, but that fact alone does not work a
constitutional deprivation . . . . [Elvidence of discrimination by white officials in Mobile is
relevant only as the most tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the constitutional invalidity of
the electoral system under which they attained their offices. . . . [Tihe mechanics of the at-
large electoral system . . . tend naturally to disadvantage any voting minority, as we noted in
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755. They are far from proof that the at-large electoral scheme
represents purposeful discrimination against Negro voters.
446 U.S. at 73-74 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted).
41. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Justice Stewart's opinion in Bolden focused on the observation in Fee-
ney that intent implies that a decisionmaker "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at
279 (footnote omitted). The Feeney opinion, however, immediately qualifies this by stating:
This is not to say that the inevitability or foreseability of consequences of a neutral rule has
no bearing upon the existence of discriminatory intent. Certainly, when the adverse conse-
quences of a law upon an identifiable group are as inevitable [as those here] . . . a strong
inference that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be drawn.
Id. at 279 n.25. In Bolden, Justice Stewart disregarded this important caveat and stated simply that,
"if the District Court meant that the state legislature may be presumed to have 'intended' that there
would be no Negro Commissioners, simply because that was a foreseeable consequence of at-large
voting, it applied an incorrect legal standard." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 72 n.17 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
42. "[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action
that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether a discriminatory intent has been
proved in a given case. More distant instances of official discrimination in other cases are of limited
help in resolving that question." Id. at 74.
43. The plurality noted:
[Wihere the character of a law is readily explainable on grounds apart from race, as would
nearly always be true where, as here, an entire system of local governance is brought into
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By stripping plaintiffs of indirect and circumstantial evidence, the plu-
rality opinion raised major obstacles to establishing the intent of an insti-
tutional defendant. The subjective intent of corporate bodies is at best a
nebulous concept, and the difficulty of defining such intent had been re-
flected in the Court's long-standing reluctance to determine the constitu-
tionality of legislative motive."
III. The Purpose of Intent
The Bolden plurality's radical restructuring of both the standard of lia-
bility and the evidentiary norms facing the prospective civil rights claim-
ant necessitates an exploration of the underpinnings of the intent doctrine
in equal protection law. Though less problematic than discovering the
unarticulated motives of a legislative body, probing the covert implications
of judicial decisions is nonetheless murky business. Brought into the light
of day, however, the intent cases stand in a line of opinions, generally
dissents, which express growing anxiety over the remedies available to
civil rights litigants. Viewed from this vantage point, the evolution of the
voting rights case law provides a fitting example of the Court's remedial
concerns.
A. The Court's Anxiety over the Scope of Relief
The current tension surrounding the use of intent is best understood
when viewed in the context of the Court's growing concern over the reme-
dies available to equal protection litigants under the equitable powers of
the federal courts. Under equity doctrine, the scope of the remedy is tied
to the nature and extent of the violation.45 The sheer magnitude of cases
and the limits of the Supreme Court's docket combine with the highly
discretionary character of equitable remedies to make restraints on reme-
dies alone highly ineffective. A far more powerful mechanism to reduce
the scope of relief is to redefine what constitutes a violation.
This concern is most directly addressed by Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence in Bolden. Justice Blackmun took no position on whether intent
need be proved, accepted Justice White's contention that, if so, it had been
in that case,4 and yet concurred in the result-a reversal of the lower
question, disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look to other evi-
dence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose.
Id. at 70.
44. See Brest, supra note 19, at 26.
45. See infra pp. 337-38.
46. "Assuming that proof of intent is a prerequisite to appellees' prevailing on their constitutional
claim of vote dilution, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Justice White that, in this case, 'the findings of
the district court amply support an inference of purposeful discrimination.'" 446 U.S. at 80 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in result).
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courts' findings of liability:
I concur in the Court's judgment of reversal, however, because I be-
lieve that the relief afforded appellees by the District Court was not
commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial discretion ...
[Elven a temporary alteration of a long-established form of munici-
pal government is a drastic measure for a court to take.' 7
The systematic exclusion of the previously established evidentiary bases of
intent in a remand on liability is thus coupled with a direct indictment of
the lower federal courts for overstepping the bounds of equity. Although
remanding on the basis of liability, the plurality opinion also suggested
concern about the scope of relief; it emphasized both the prevalence of at-
large municipal elections in the United States48 and the fact that "an en-
tire system of local governance is brought into question.""9 The plurality
remand, however, because it was based on liability, did not need to dwell
on the scope of relief.
The Court's concern with the scope of relief in equal protection cases
actually antedated Bolden. The controversy surrounding school busing or-
ders in the early 1970's 50 prompted a popular chorus of "judicial re-
straint,""1 which was joined by willing voices in a number of Court opin-
ions. Writing in dissent in Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,52
Justice Powell, the most outspoken member of the Court on this issue,
accused the Court of being "remarkably insensitive to the now widely ac-
cepted view that . . . the federal judiciary should be limiting rather than
expanding the extent to which courts are operating the public school sys-
tems of our country."5 But, as Professor Bell has noted, "Whatever the
accuracy of this interpretation [the Court's actual concern with broad
remedies], the lower courts seemingly received quite the opposite
message."
'54
Looking back from the perspective of Bolden, a trend is clearly discern-
ible. Prior to the adoption of the intent test, it was established judicial
doctrine that once liability was found, courts had broad discretion in
47. Id. at 80-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
48. Id. at 60 n.7 (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 70 (plurality opinion).
50. See J.H. WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 203-15 (1979) (discussing explosive Boston
events surrounding court-ordered busing).
51. See, e.g., Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB. INTEREST 64 (1978);
Taylor, Bar Urged to Join Fight on Politics in the Courts, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1982, at B8, col. I
(report of Attorney General Smith's attack on courts' "political policy making").
52. 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
53. Id. at 479-80.
54. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 405 (2d ed. 1980).
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framing equitable relief.55 As articulated in a voting practice case: "[T]he
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will
so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as
bar like discrimination in the future."56 Milliken V' which in 1974 or-
dered the first reversal of a lower court desegregation order since Brown
v. Board of Education,58 introduced open concern with the scope of relief
into the Court's opinions. As expressed by the majority in Hills v. Gau-
treaux,59 the reversal in Milliken I was "based on fundamental limitations
on the remedial powers to restructure the operation of local and state gov-
ernmental entities." 60
In the aftermath of Washington v. Davis, four lower court decisions
ordering school desegregation were remanded to establish liability in light
of the intent standard."1 In Austin Independent School District v. United
States,62 despite the remand, Justice Powell authored a long concurrence,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, that focused on the
use of busing as a remedial tool. 3 Other opinions that focus on the scope
of relief though deciding questions of liability include Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,6 4 Chief Justice Bur-
ger's opinion in Miliken I," Justice Powell's dissent in Columbus,66 and
the per curiam opinion in Omaha 11.
17
These initial attempts to curtail remedies were based upon a restrictive
definition of liability under the intent doctrine. Lower federal courts were
then ordered to match relief to the narrow violation. 8 Again it was Jus-
55. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971), the Court declared:
"[Tihe scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." In a companion case, the Court added that "the mea-
sure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness." Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33,
37 (1971).
56. United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
57. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
60. Id. at 293.
61. Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (school desegregation order remanded in light of
Arlington Heights to establish intent); School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (racially
disproportionate impact not sufficient; intent must be proved); Board of School Comm'rs v. Buckley,
429 U.S. 1068 (1976); Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
62. 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
63. Id. at 991 (issue of remedy included in remand because of extensive nature of lower court
relief order).
64. 443 U.S. 526, 544 (1978) ("meting out of equal remedies" for school desegregation
unwarranted).
65. 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974) (remedial supervision of school systems is task for which judges
are not qualified).
66. 443 U.S. 449, 483 (1979) (remedial orders typify intrusions upon local authorities that ad-
versely effect quality of education).
67. School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 667, 668-69 (1977) (remanding case to determine
incremental segregative effect of violations and order remedy accordingly).
68. Contrast the Keyes presumption, which inferred intent and therefore liability throughout a
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tice Powell who tied this directly to an open indictment of equitable reme-
dies. Dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari in Estes v. Metropolitan
Branches of Dallas NAACP, 9 decided the same Term as Bolden, and
joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, he wrote:
[T]his case presents a long-needed opportunity to re-examine the
considerations relevant to framing a remedy in a desegregation suit.
• . . The District Court failed to identify the link between the con-
stitutional violation and the desegregation remedy. . . . Unless
courts carefully consider those issues, judicial school desegregation
will continue to be a haphazard exercise of equitable power that can,
"like a loose cannon, . . . inflict indiscriminate damage" on our
schools and communities."0
Writing in 1980, Professor Derrick Bell noted the Court's concern with
remedy when considering liability in the immediate post-Davis period:
Reading between the lines of the Supreme Court's remands during
the 1976-1977 Term, it appeared that while discussing the standard
of liability that the lower courts should require, the Court actually
was expressing concern about the cost and disruptiveness of the rem-
edies which were entered.7
1
B. Eliminating Remedies
The hostility to the scope of remedies available to the successful equal
protection litigant threatened to erupt into a doctrinal broadside against
the remedial powers of federal courts, as occurred in the Bolden plurality
opinion. Any attempt to bar remedies altogether, however, necessarily en-
tails a fundamental alteration of the substantive constitutional doctrine.
Thus, the evolution of the intent doctrine and its associated evidentiary
burdens is best understood as a contrivance to confine the federal judiciary
in matters of equal protection relief. 2 The intent standard is a particu-
school district if it could be established in any subdivision, with the narrow emphasis on liability
limited to the jurisdiction in which intent could be established in Milliken I, or limited to the actual
perpetrator of the unconstitutional act in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
69. 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
70. Id. at 445. While Justice Powell's remarks in Estes were directed at school desegregation
orders, they have clear implications for any broad equitable relief. As noted in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg School Dist., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971), school desegregation orders do "not differ fun-
damentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable relief."
71. D. BELL, supra note 54, at 405. Professor Karst writes in a similar vein: "The preoccupation
has been with issues such as the asserted invasion by the judiciary of the legislative province, with
doubts concerning judicial competence to understand and decide certain kinds of questions or provide
certain kinds of remedies (notably those involving the imposition of affirmative duties on the states)
." Karst, supra note 10, at 4 n.16.
72. The intent doctrine is ill suited to the reality of race relations in the United States. The legacy
of slavery, the pervasiveness of de jure segregation only a generation ago, the bitter racism that still
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larly powerful mechanism to restructure the relationship between the civil
rights litigant and federal courts for three reasons.
First, intent differs from comity, 3 abstention,"' deference, 75 and feder-
alism7 -doctrines that have also come to the fore in the past decade-in
that the latter only curtail the availablity of the federal forum. Each of
these doctrines addresses the capacity of a litigant to get into federal court,
and the relationship between the remedies available through federal court
and those that can be obtained in state court or state administrative pro-
ceedings. An intent standard, by contrast, redefines the constitutional vio-
lation and thus restricts the relief available.
Second, in establishing liability, an intent standard raises serious
problems of proof. Although this difficulty arises in many contexts, it is
compounded when the defendant state agent is a state legislature rather
than an individual administrator. Simply put, it is in dealing with corpo-
infects every pore of American politics and society, the continued concentration of blacks at the bottom
of the proverbial ladder-all these defy characterization as innocent state action that perpetuates or
aggravates racial oppression. The notion of allegedly innocent acts disadvantaging blacks is persua-
sively challenged by Professor Lawrence:
Once the state has effectively institutionalized racial segregation as a labeling device, only min-
imal maintenance is required to keep it in working order. Once the system is established, any
attempt to distinguish "active" governmental involvement in racial segregation from "passive"
or "neutral" tolerance of private segregation is illusory. Present passivity is merely a continua-
tion of past action.
Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood, 12 U.S.F. L. REV. 15, 40 (1977). The same theme appears in
Justice Powell's Keyes opinion: "Indeed, if one goes back far enough, it is probable that all racial
segregation, wherever occurring and whether or not confined to the schools, has at some time been
supported or maintained by government action." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 228 n.12
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The intent doctrine unrealistically supposes that government entities are unaware of the probable
racial consequences of their actions. See Simon, supra note 9, at 1111. The point is brought home by
Professor Karst:
If we were talking about some new form of discrimination-say, discrimination against per-
sons with red hair, or discrimination against whites-then the "purpose" doctrine would make
eminent sense, as would its corollary view that stigmatic harm can result only when there is a
purpose to cause it. But in America today, where the problem of racism is the problem of
eliminating a long-established stigma of inferiority . . . it is as plain as a cattle prod that we
are talking about something quite different. A legislature oblivious to this existing stigma of
caste will nonetheless reinforce the stigma when it produces racially discriminatory effects
through ostensibly "neutral" legislation.
Karst, supra note 10, at 51.
73. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (discussing "the principles of equity,
comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court"); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971) (courts should be restrained by comity, "a proper respect for state functions").
74. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (abstention in civil suits in which
state is a party); Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-16 (1976)
(abstention in favor of state court proceedings); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)
(abstention in state civil proceedings akin to criminal prosecution); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
43-44 (1971) (federal court abstention in state criminal prosecutions).
75. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (deference to state court's ability to
protect constitutional rights).
76. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-80 (1976) (federalism weighs heavily against injunc-
tive relief against a state).
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rate state bodies, as opposed to individuals, that subjective motive is the
most difficult to prove and the easiest to mask.77 Moreover, it is against
just such corporate bodies that broad-scale relief is the likely result of a
finding of liability. By allowing only direct evidence of subjective motive,
the Bolden plurality effectively insulated the actions of corporate bod-
ies-the municipality,78  the legislature, or the popular referen-
dum-from judicial review. A legislature assured that only direct evi-
dence in the record will be admissible proof of invidious purpose will
surely cast electoral redistricting in terms of "efficient government" and
school redistricting in terms of "good education," regardless of its actual
motivation." Even inferential proof of intent is insufficient when the chal-
lenged practice is a long-lasting one requiring a minimum of maintenance
to preserve its discriminatory effects.
Third, combined with the already established doctrine that the remedy
must be strictly tailored to the violation,"' the redefinition of liability in
terms of intent rather than impact82 may preclude remedies even in cases
where intent can be proved. In strictly tailoring a remedy to a finding of
liability based on intent, a court might limit itself to effectuating only that
which would have occurred but for the illicit motive, 3 and thereby allow
a defendant to show that "it would have reached the same decision" for
77. See Alexander, supra note 27, at 937-38.
78. See City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981) (street closing preventing black motor-
ists traversing white neighborhood not intended to discriminate).
79. See Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1981), on reh'g, 669 F.2d 316 (1982).
The Kirksey court added a new twist to equal protection litigation by holding the motives of voters to
be beyond judicial examination on First Amendment grounds. On rehearing the Fifth Circuit backed
off and declared that in a "proper case" motivation may be explored. No definition of a "proper case"
was given. 669 F.2d at 316.
80. By assuring state bodies that only direct statements indicating intent will prompt federal court
review, the Court provides an incentive to police only what appears in official records. As the Fifth
Circuit observed: "[Tihere will be no 'smoking gun.'" Lodge v. Burton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1981), afl'd sub nom. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982). Where, however, the form of
judicial relief sought is simply a cease and desist order against the application of a facially neutral
ordinance by an individual administrator, the equal protection litigant's burden may still be manage-
able-subjective motivation is easier to ascertain in such cases than in the case of a corporate body. Cf.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down selective prosecution of Chinese-
Americans).
81. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 82 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
82. Were intent to be established according to the standard of the Bolden plurality, constitutional
liability would stem from the motives of the Alabama state legislature rather than the systematic
exclusion of blacks from elected office in Mobile.
83. The principal advocate of a but-for standard of liability under the intent doctrine is Professor
Samford. See Samford, supra note 11. He does not, however, confine remedy to the but-for origin of
liability. Professor Eisenberg, on the other hand, favors adoption of a but-for and proximate cause
test, but irrespective of the question of motive. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 58-69, 94.
For a discussion of the opposition to the use of a but-for standard for equal protection doctrine, see
Brest, supra note 2, at 130-31; Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An As-
sessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1376, 1407 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94
HARv. L. REV. 75, 147 (1980).
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other valid reasons.84
C. The Intent Standard Applied to Fundamental Rights
The obstacles to a successful equal protection claim under the intent
standard apply regardless of the doctrinal basis of the claim. In the case of
the fundamental rights strain of the doctrine, however, the obstacles are
still greater since the source of the constitutional claim is not the explicit
or implicit purpose of the classification mechanism. Thus, prior to Bolden,
intent analysis had not been applied to cases that involved the abridge-
ment of fundamental rights.85 Davis itself made no mention of the funda-
mental rights line of Fourteenth Amendment decisions; it held a finding of
intent necessary only in the context of challenges based on discriminatory
treatment of a suspect class.88 Similarly, the line of intent decisions be-
tween Davis and Bolden was confined to cases involving no constitutional
entitlement. 87 The subsequent imposition of an intent standard in the area
of fundamental rights is consistent with the Court's attempts to limit the
84. Mt. Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Mt. Healthy involved the
proper treatment of state administrative decisions motivated both by a legitimate and discriminatory
purpose-in particular the discharge of a teacher because, at least in part, of an exercise of First
Amendment rights. The broader issue was how much invidious motive would be required to invali-
date state action.
For discussion of the problems of mixed motive and the difficulty involved in pinpointing the illicit
motives which are sufficient to overturn legislation, see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92-93
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (systems that disadvantage minorities should not be sus-
tained simply because no motive can be proved); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (rarely is legislature motivated by single purpose); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (legitimate state action not unconstitu-
tional because of motive of one legislator voting in favor); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77
(1973) (search for purpose elusive enough without trying to ascertain primacy); Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (difficult or impossible for any court to determine sole or dominant motiva-
tion behind choices of group of legislators); Brest, supra note 2, at 126 (judicial review based on
intent may spark attempts to conceal motive); Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 116-17 (summarizing objec-
tions to intent standard); Ely, supra note 2, at 1215-57, 1280 (exploring difficulty of judicial adminis-
tration of intent test).
85. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113-14 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (racial classifications subject to strict scrutiny
upon establishment of invidious discriminatory purpose).
87. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 114 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), involved the use of tests in the hiring of police officers in Washington,
D.C. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), dealt
with the validity of residential zoning regulations that prevented the construction of low- and moder-
ate-income housing. Neither federal employment nor housing is subject to an affirmative constitutional
entitlement.
Until Davis, both fundamental rights and suspect classifications were judged under strict scrutiny.
Consequently, there was little need or incentive to sort out the different strains of equal protection
analysis. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 83, at 143 n.42. Thus, for example, in both
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), in which
plaintiffs were minority groups, the decisions did not clearly distinguish whether the claims were
analyzed as involving suspect classification status or fundamental rights. Davis shifted the presump-
tions against suspect classification litigants and thus brought the potential difference between the two
strains into sharp relief.
Intent and Equal Protection
scope of equal protection remedies.
Justice Marshall's Bolden dissent argued that the plurality's applica-
tion of an intent standard to a vote dilution claim was a unique and mis-
taken intrusion into the fundamental rights area."8 That view is made
more compelling when intent is placed in the context of the two-tier scru-
tiny out of which it developed. Purposeful discrimination is an inherent
aspect of every suspect classification case; such discriminatory classifica-
tion is the articulated intent of the statute or other state action. With the
gradual disappearance of explicit racial classifications, the focus of equal
protection litigation shifted to cases involving actions that were facially
neutral but had a disadvantageous impact on suspect classes. In such
cases, proof of intent to disadvantage a suspect class can be seen as a
proxy for the explicit intent of a suspect classification in providing a basis
for strict scrutiny. As noted by Professor Ely, "Disproportionate racial
impact is usually the best evidence that race has been employed as the
criterion of selection. This frequent conjunction . . . is doubtless one rea-
son courts generally, like the Court in Gomillion [v. Lightfoot"9 ], have
failed to indicate which factor triggers the judicial response."90
The fundamental rights doctrine, on the other hand, does not address
facial discrimination. It was designed instead to delineate protected spher-
es in which discriminatory state action would always be suspect, regard-
less of the classification mechanism. Under traditional fundamental rights
analysis, strict scrutiny did not follow from discriminatory intent but from
impact upon protected rights, abridgement of which necessitated a compel-
ling state interest. 1 Thus, Professor Ely notes: "Where what is denied is
something to which the complainant has a substantive constitutional
right-either because it is granted by the terms of the Constitution, or
because it is essential to the effective governing of a democratic govern-
ment-the reasons it was denied are irrelevant."2
Vote dilution infringes upon substantial constitutional rights. 3 Justice
Stewart admitted as much in Bolden: "[T]he Equal Protection Clause
88. 446 U.S. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (city annexation struck down where it had effect of diluting black votes
and where there was inference of discriminatory motive from "uncouth" 28-sided-city line).
90. Ely, supra note 2, at 1254.
91. See supra note 5.
92. Ely, The Centrality and Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155, 1161
(1978). Professor Ely adds, "It would be a tragedy of the first order were the Court to expand its
burgeoning awareness of the relevance of motivation into the thoroughly mistaken notion that a denial
of a constitutional right does not count as such unless it was intentional." Id.
93. For discussion of the fundamental centrality of the right to vote, see Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); J. ELY, supra note 9, at 135-36; Karst, supra note 10, at 27-29;
Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multi-member Districts: The Constitutional Standard After Washing-
ton v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694, 720-26 (1978).
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confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis
with other qualified voters." '94 The right at stake in vote dilution cases has
been summarized elsewhere as that of a "'fair chance' of influencing the
political process." '' Its starting point is the declaration in Reynolds v.
Sims9" of every citizen's "inalienable right to full and effective participa-
tion in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies."'97 As noted
by Justice Marshall in his Bolden dissent, Fortson v. Dorsey 8 and Burns
v. Richardson9 indicated that at-large elections would violate that right if
"designedly or otherwise" they operated to "minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population."'
100
The Bolden plurality's insistence on proof of intent in a vote dilution
case is not supported by precedent. While the "totality of the circum-
stances" test in White v. Regester' l0 can be seen as adumbrating a later
intent standard, there is, for example, no foundation for Justice Stewart's
characterization of White as "strongly indicating that only a purposeful
dilution of the plaintiff's vote would offend the Equal Protection
Clause."' 1 2 The opinion in White refers alternately to the purpose and
effects of vote dilution without articulating their relationship.' 0 3 Equally
unsupported is Justice Stewart's contention that "our decisions, moreover,
have made clear that action by a State . . .violates the Fifteenth Amend-
ment only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose."'0 4 The cases cited to
support this proposition indicate only that invidious purpose may be suffi-
cient to constitute a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, not that it is a
precondition for liability.'0 5
94. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 77 (1980) (plurality opinion). It may be, as Justice
Marshall claimed in dissent, 446 U.S. at 113, that because the plaintiffs in Bolden were black the
plurality applied the intent standard as if it were a suspect classification case. Justice Stewart's ac-
knowledgment, however, of the constitutional entitlement renders such analysis illegitimate since this
would implicate the fundamental rights strain of the doctrine.
95. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 83, at 145 n.58.
96. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
97. Id. at 565.
98. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
99. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
100. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 108 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fort-
son v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
101. 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973).
102. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 69 (plurality opinion).
103. White focused on the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the Dallas and
Bexar counties' electoral systems unconstitutionally diluted minority voting strength. The Court threw
out at-large elections despite admitting that the specific attributes of the electoral system were "neither
in themselves improper nor invidious." 412 U.S. at 766.
104. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
105. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 58 (1964) (no ruling on whether de facto discrimi-
natory redistricting did or could exist); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41 (1960) (redis-
tricting Tuskegee, Ala., with goal and effect of disenfranchising Negro citizens unconstitutional; no
claim that motive was necessary); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (purpose and
effect of literacy test grounds for striking it down); see also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra
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D. Voting Rights Claims: Rights and Remedies
An examination of the voting rights context from which the Bolden
opinion arose underscores the central analytic point of this Note. Success-
ful claims of vote dilution necessarily involve the judiciary in broad reme-
dial actions against state electoral systems, including the possibility of
overturning electoral results.
Thus, Justice Stewart's acknowledgment in Bolden of the substantive
constitutional rights at stake in vote dilution cases, coupled with his appli-
cation of a severe intent test, is perhaps less paradoxical when viewed
against the Court's longstanding hesitation to invalidate at-large election
schemes, 06 and its refusal to hold them unconstitutional per se. 107 The
Court's vote dilution decisions may reflect an unspoken concern that no
easily managed judicial standard for measuring adequate representation of
minorities-one comparable to the one person, one vote test enunciated in
Reynolds v. Sims "08 for reapportionment cases-is available. In fact, Jus-
note 83, at 143 n.43 (cases cited by plurality opinion showed discriminatory purpose sufficient but not
necessary for claim).
106. Prior to Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982), only one Supreme Court case, White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), had found an at-large election to be in violation of constitutional
rights. While conceding that multimember districts may enhance the voting strength of majorities, the
Court has been wary of constitutionalizing the outcome of elections. No decision has guaranteed the
election of any particular candidate or representative of any particular group. "As our system has it,
one candidate wins, the others lose." Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).
The uneasiness over the nature of the rights involved, see, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144, 166-67 (1977) (no right to proportional representation by race or other group characteris-
tic); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (same); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-
57 (1971) (same), resulted in elevated burdens of proof specific to vote dilution cases, see White, 412
U.S. at 766; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), af'd per curiam
on other grounds sub nor. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1977). As
stated by the Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis, "[W]e have insisted that the challenger carry the burden
of proving that multi-member districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting
strength of racial or political elements. We have not yet sustainted such an attack." 403 U.S. at 144.
107. See Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) (per curiam) (Texas reapportionment containing
multimember districts upheld); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) (equal protection clause does
not require single-member districts); Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) (no constitutional re-
quirement that all districts be single-member).
108. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The concern over justiciable standards in voting rights claims is a
recurrent one. Professor Ely argues that considerations of administrability were central to the adop-
tion of the Reynolds one person, one vote rule. J. ELY, supra note 9, at 123-25; see also Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 664-
73 (1981) (one person, one vote malapportionment standard molded to fit judiciary's institutional
needs).
Some evidence of concern over justiciability can be found in the specific invocation in Justice Stew-
art's Bolden opinion of the widespread use of at-large elections as weighing against judicial interven-
tion. 446 U.S. at 60 n.7 (plurality opinion). Prevalence alone, however, does not immunize a practice
from judicial review and possible reversal; court rulings ordering the desegregation of schools faced the
entrenched practice of racially separated education throughout the states of the former Confederacy.
Moreover, it is a perverse notion that the widespread use of at-large elections should generate defer-
ence toward them. The fundamental character of the rights at stake and the prevalence of the practice
in jurisdictions that had de jure segregation argue for greater judicial solicitude, rather than deference.
See Parker, supra note 37, at 109. Even those who advocate limiting judicial intervention to process
distortions allow for special solicitude in the case of state action that threatens the democratic process
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tice Stevens' concurrence in Bolden'0 9 and his dissent in Rogers'" specifi-
cally invoke such concern over justiciability.
Whatever the extent of the Court's concern over problems of jus-
ticiability, the effect of Bolden was to establish an unattainable standard
of liability. Because election systems are invariably adopted by large legis-
lative bodies or by referenda, a rule against evaluating intent inferentially
bars the establishment of liability, and, a fortiori, eliminates the possibility
of a successful vote dilution claim against an at-large election system. This
approach effectively treats vote dilution as a political question, leaving its
resolution to the political process by ensuring that the standard for judicial
action can never be met. But such deference is absurd on its face; the
vindication of voting rights can hardly be trusted to the very representa-
tives whose election is the result of the alleged vote dilution."' If the
Court is motivated by a genuine wish to encourage the "political settle-
ments""' 2 of the historic and ongoing effects of discrimination, it can do so
only by first ensuring that blacks have adequate access to the political
process.'"
as a whole. See J. ELY, supra note 9, at 73-104; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-1
(1978).
In addition, the plurality opinion fails to note the mounting evidence that at-large elections together
with gerrymandering and malapportionment have been used to dilute black votes. Bass, Election Laws
and Their Manipulation to Exclude Minority Votes, in ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION CONFERENCE
REPORT: THE RIGHT TO VOTE 1, 8 (1981); Parker, supra note 37, at 109-10. As noted by Jack Bass,
"In recent years, Southern historians have begun to document and emphasize that reforms of the
Progressive movement became tools to achieve disenfranchisement in the South. According to one of
them, 'the official work of undoing Reconstruction was concluded in the midst of the 20th Century's
first reform movement.'" Bass, supra, at 19. The adoption of at-large elections occurred alongside the
combination of racism and reform that characterized the period in the South. "The blind spot in the
Southern progressive record . . . was the Negro, for the whole movement in the South coincided
paradoxically with the crest of the wave of racism. . .. Racism was conceived of by some as the very
foundation of Southern progressivism." C.V. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 91
(3d ed. 1974).
109. 446 U.S. at 93 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). justice Stevens specifically relies
on the notion of the conservation of judicial resources proposed by justice Frankfurter in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267-70 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (court rulings on matters of discre-
tionary state action would entangle judiciary in political thicket and threaten legitimacy).
110. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S. Ct. 3272, 3285 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
111. See Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 390-95 (S.D. Ala. 1976), afl'd, 571 F.2d
238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The district court's findings showed
discrimination to exist not simply in the electoral mechanism devised for selection of the city council,
but throughout an entire range of social services and municipal decisions. Few blacks were employed
in higher levels of city service. The city was under court order to desegregate its police and fire
departments. Black neighborhoods had inferior roads, sewers, drainage, and sidewalks. In general the
Court found: "[T]here is a singular sluggishness and low priority in meeting these particularized
black neighborhood needs when compared with a higher priority of temporary allocation of resources
when the white community is involved." Id. at 392.
112. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. There is no reason to believe that direct proof of subjective motive is the only judicially
manageable standard for vote dilution. judicially manageable standards for constitutionally impermis-
sible institutional discrimination have been successfully applied in other contexts. Presumptions have
been permitted in equal protection litigation involving a history of de jure discrimination. In school
Intent and Equal Protection
The Bolden plurality's insistence upon direct evidence of intent pro-
voked an immediate outcry from commentators,114 - Congress,"1 5 and at
least one lower federal court. 1 6 Further confirming the central remedial
concern of Bolden, on July 1, 1982, only two days after Congress restored
the statutory Voting Rights Act remedies the Bolden plurality had re-
moved, 117 the Supreme Court backed off from the most restrictive implica-
desegregation cases, for example, the Court has allowed the existence of pre-Brown state-ordered
segregation to impose an affirmative duty to desegregate and to create a presumption of unconstitu-
tionality against post-Brown de facto segregation. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
437-38 (1968). A similar presumption could be adopted against jurisdictions that show effects of vote
dilution, which have a history of pre-Voting Rights Act (1965) discriminatory voting registration
practices or which are covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). Such
a standard would strike down practices that perpetuate or aggravate a history of discrimination, with-
out imposing a per se rule against at-large elections, and was in fact adopted by the Fifth Circuit in
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In that
challenge to a Mississippi county redistricting plan, the court ruled that "a redistricting plan is consti-
tutionally impermissible as racially discriminatory if it is a racially motivated gerrymander or if it
perpetuates an existent denial of access by the racial minority to the political process." Id. at 142.
In addition, application of an intent standard to all equal protection claims exacerbates problems of
justiciability. Subjective intent to discriminate is a particularly unattractive label that judges are often
reluctant to attach to government officials. Subjective intent is also difficult to prove, especially in
multimember bodies, and easy to obscure, particularly as decisionmakers become aware of the legal
standard being applied.
The Court's peregrinations on the use of intent have been carefully mapped out by Professor Eisen-
berg and demonstrate that problems of justiciability are simply accentuated:
An examination of the decisions in the thirteen years since Griffin reveals the magnitude of the
Court's confusion about motive. In Griffin, the Court expressly relied on motive. In Palmer,
the Court said it did not rely on motive in Griffin. In Palmer and in O'Brien, the Court stated
that it would not rely on motive, and, in a short-lived explanation, declared that only impact
mattered. In Washington, the Court partially retreated from the Palmer-O'Brien rhetoric, of-
fered a shallow explanation of Palmer, and indicated a willingness to rely on discriminatory
motives. In Arlington Heights, the Court completed the circle by returning in substantial part
to the Griffin position on motive. This chaos stems from the Court's failure to articulate why
motive is relevant in constitutional adjudication.
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 113 (citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 37; Comment, City of Mobile v. Bolden: A Setback in the Fight
Against Discrimination, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 169 (1980); Note, City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden:
The Requirement of Discriminatory Intent in Vote Dilution Claims, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 639 (1980);
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 83, at 138; Note, Voting Rights: Stuck Inside of Mobile
with the Voting Blues Again. Vote Dilution Claims Confined, 10 STETSON L. REV. 363 (1981).
115. See S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982). Discussing the Voting Rights Act
extension (S. 1992), the report states:
S. 1992 amends Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. . . to make clear that proof of discrimina-
tory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. It thereby restores the legal
standards, based on the controlling Supreme Court precedents, which applied to voting dis-
crimination claims prior to the litigation involved in Mobile v. Bolden.
116. See Jones v. City of Lubbock, 640 F.2d 777, 777-79 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
117. Id. Discussing the Voting Rights Act extension, Rep. James Sesenbrenner stated:
We are writing into law our understanding of the test in White against Regester. And our
understanding is that this looks only to the results of the challenged law . . . . But should the
Highest Court in the land-or a majority of that Court-conclude that there is a purpose
element in White, then the committee has nonetheless drafted a bill that does not incorporate
this requirement . ...
128 CONG. REC. H3841 (daily ed. June 23, 1982).
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tions of Bolden. In Rogers v. Lodge,'18 the Court declared that "discrimi-
natory intent need not be proven by direct evidence,"" 9 and found
unconstitutional vote dilution based upon a fact situation almost identical
to that in Bolden.12 0 The Bolden plurality opinion attempted to disengage
federal courts from restructuring local governments in response to equal
protection suits, primarily by extending the scope of the intent doctrine.
Following Congress' restoration of an intent-free statutory standard, the
Court in Rogers grudgingly handed down a fact-specific voting rights de-
cision, heavily laden with dicta confirming the role of intent in all equal
protection litigation. Ironically, because of the availability of a statutory
remedy, the voting rights terrain upon which the intent standard has been
nurtured should be the least affected among equal protection claims.
Despite the statutory remedy, Rogers is a paradoxical decision that ex-
118. 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982).
119. Id. at 3276.
120. The contrast between the two opinions is highlighted by the comparision in Table 1 of the




"It may be that Negro candidates have Racial bloc voting plus evidence that all
been defeated, but that fact alone does not black candidates have been defeated "bear
work a constitutional deprivation." 446 heavily on the issue of purposeful
U.S. at 73. discrimination" and constitute "important
evidence of purposeful exclusion." 102 S.
Ct. at 3279.
"[Elvidence of discrimination by white Evidence of official unresponsiveness to
officials is relevant only as the most blacks "increases the likelihood that the
tenuous and circumstantial evidence of the political process was not equally open to
constitutional invalidity of the electoral blacks." Id. at 3280.
system under-which they attained their
offices." Id. at 74.
"[P]ast discrimination cannot, in the "Evidence of historical discrimination is
manner of original sin, condemn relevant to drawing an inference of
governmental action that is not itself purposeful discrimination, particularly in
unlawful." Id. cases such as this one where the evidence
shows that discriminatory practices were
commonly utilized, that they were
abandoned when enjoined by courts or
made illegal by civil rights legislation, and
that they were replaced by laws and
practices which, though neutral on their
face, serve to maintain the status quo." Id.
"[Tihe mechanics of the at-large electoral Particular factors of at-large systems
system . . . are far from proof that the at- "enhance the tendency of multimember
large electoral scheme represents purposeful districts to minimize the voting strength of
discrimination against Negro voters." Id. racial minorities." Id.
Intent and Equal Protection
acerbates the confusion in equal protection doctrine. Although professing
fidelity to Bolden, Rogers allowed for a diametrically opposite result and
liberalized the harsh evidentiary requirements set forth by the Bolden plu-
rality. At the same time, Rogers is the first majority opinion requiring
constitutional vote dilution claimants to prove discriminatory purpose in
order to establish liability. Rogers reworks White v. Regester121 into the
general framework of intent analysis and strongly suggests that the Fifth
Circuit's Zimmer v. McKeithen12 2 factors should be regarded as the cen-
tral indicia of discriminatory intent,"'3 yet provides no explanation of why
these factors were held to be insufficient in Bolden. Nor is there any proof
that transforming this evidentiary test in Rogers into the factual basis
from which district courts may infer intent aids justiciability.
Without a clearly articulated doctrine governing the scope of intent,
1 24
Rogers reduces equal protection claims to particularized findings of fact
1 25
capable of tolerating the same discriminatory practices in Mobile, Ala-
bama, found to be unconstitutional in Burke County, Georgia.
Conclusion
Intent has emerged as the doctrinal linchpin in the Burger Court's re-
evaluation of the remedies available to equal protection litigants in federal
courts. Lurking behind the expanded scope of the intent doctrine is the
Court's hostility to relief afforded civil rights plaintiffs. Indeed, by casting
the intent requirement over all Fourteenth Amendment litigation, the
Court has ominously restricted the capacity of disadvantaged minorities to
vindicate constitutional rights1 28 and thereby produced a devastating re-
definition of their substantive rights.
The Court's use of intent as the standard for constitutional liability is
perfectly consonant with a substantive view of American society as not
responsible for the affirmative advancement of blacks and other disadvan-
121. 412 U.S. 755 (1973); see supra note 37.
122. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), af'd per curiam on other grounds sub nom. East
Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); see supra note 37.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 3277-78.
124. The Court held the district court's findings of fact not clearly erroneous and relied on the
"two-court" rule to not "disturb findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts." 102 S. Ct. at
3279.
125. See Pullman Standard v. Swint, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1789-91 (1982) (deferential "clearly erro-
neous" treatment to lower court rulings on intent).
126. This restriction is carried even further in a recent plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist
precluding judicial inquiry into legislative motive. In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981), Justice Rehnquist cites Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) and United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) to maintain that it is impermissible to strike down statutes "on the
basis of an alleged illict motive." 450 U.S. at 472 n.7. Significantly, these cases are cited alongside
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Thus, to establish liability, the litigant would need to prove invidi-
ous purpose while eschewing any inquiry into legislative motive.
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taged minorities, a view that ignores the institutional legacies of historical
discrimination. If the nature of the violation is defined by its impact on a
disadvantaged group,12 the appropriate scope of the remedy is equitable
relief from the effects of discrimination. But if the violation may be found
solely in illicit present motives, relief need not, and indeed may not, try to
remedy the institutional perpetuation of historical discrimination. Intent,
by taking a perpetrator perspective, 128 reduces the role of the court to a
check on the motives of the state actor, an inherently limited endeavor.
The substantive view underlying the Bolden plurality opinion is suc-
cinctly expressed in Justice Stewart's remark that "reconstruction is
over."129 Reconstruction assumed an affirmative state obligation to redress
the history of discrimination against blacks. During that period blacks
voted and held office throughout the former Confederacy. "As a voter the
Negro was both hated and cajoled, both intimidated and courted, but he
could never be ignored so long as he voted."'
30
The demise of Reconstruction, the period of "redemption," witnessed
the heralding of local self-government as a buttress against the Civil War
Amendments and the post-War gains of the freed slaves. Forged in the
fire of virulent racism, Jim Crow laws removed blacks from the electorate,
shunted them to second class schools and railway cars, and even kept them
from the water fountains and telephone booths reserved for whites.
Efforts to dismantle the institutionalized, codified caste-treatment of
blacks resurged after World War II, particularly after Brown. The paral-
lels to the post-Civil War period led commentators to term this a second
Reconstruction,' and the current. retrenchment on civil rights remedies
Redemption II.132 Focusing on the subjective intent of the state actor and
thereby limiting remedies, the Court has now given constitutional protec-
tion to the entrenched practices of local governments that systematically
disadvantage blacks in what is still a fundamentally discriminatory soci-
127. See Freeman, Legitimating Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Crit-
ical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052 (1978) (terming this view the
victim perspective); Fiss, supra note 9 (discussing group focus in equal protection).
128. Freeman, supra note 127, at 1052-57.
129. This remark was made in a discussion with Yale law students in the Justice's chambers on
Feb. 24, 1981.
130. C.V. WOODWARD, supra note 108, at 54.
131. See T. DRAPER, THE REDISCOVERY OF BLACK NATIONALISM 176 (1969) ("In some ways we
are living through a second Reconstruction in order to avoid a second Civil War.").
132. Foner, Redemption II, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 23, col. 2. Among the points of similar-
ity, Professor Foner notes:
With Redemption, efforts to enforce laws promoting racial integration were abandoned. The
15th Amendment, guaranteeing blacks' voting rights, was reduced to a mockery by economic
and physical intimidation of black voters and by poll taxes. Blacks' political power was also
limited by more subtle means, some of which survive today: gerrymandering districts and the
use of at-large elections.
Id. at 23, col. 4.
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Intent and Equal Protection
ety. In effect, the intent doctrine defines the past as a tabula rasa immune
from constitutional attack.
Intent may obscure the exact nature of an equal protection violation,
but it does not hide the devastating consequences of this doctrine for the
vindication of substantive rights. By forcing the victims of entrenched dis-
crimination in this country to establish the motives of institutional actors,
either directly as in Bolden or inferentially through heightened evidentiary
requirements as in Rogers, the Court has defined the rights of these vic-
tims in such a manner as to preclude effective remedies. For many of the
victims of racial discrimination, the intent standard comes close to estab-
lishing a right for which there can be no remedy. Such a right is no right
at all.138
133. "To take away all remedy for the enforcement of a right is to take away the right itself."
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1885).
